Opslag

"[...]words are like the shadows of things[...]"

"Perhaps we have not clearly learned that the names which signify that which comes into being are successive to the things and that nominal words are like the shadows of things, which receive form according to the movements of that which subsists in hypostasis ( τῶν ὑφεστωτων)?" (CE II, GNO I, 269, 11-14, tr. Maspero, 2007, p. 104)

"[...]when human nature is liberated from the double composition, and returns perfectly to the good, having become simple and impossible to represent and truly one , then that which appears will be the same as that which is hidden[...]"

"Since then, it is believed that the divine nature ( τό θεῖον) is simple ( ἁπλοῦν), free from composition (ἀσύνθετον) and impossible to represent (ἀσχημάτιστον), when human nature ( τό ἀντθρώπινον) is liberated from the double composition, and returns perfectly ( ἀκριβῶς) to the good, having become simple and impossible to represent and truly one ( ώς αληθῶς ἕν γενομενον), then that which appears will be the same as that which is hidden, and that which is hidden the same as that which appears, then truly is carried to accomplishment the beatitude and such man are truly called sons of God, proclaimed blessed according to the promise of our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom be glory for eternity. Amen" (Gal 1.5, Heb 13.21 and 2 Tm 4.18) (On the Beatitudes, GNO VII/2, 160, tr. Maspero, 2007, p. 73)

Gregory of Nyssa: "[...]it is impossible that those realities that are separated from each other by natural principle coincide with one another in the form of activities[...]"

"Therefore, if we see that the activities (ἐνεργείας) performed by the ( ἐνεργουμένας παρα) Father, by the Son and by the Holy Spirit differ one from another, based in the diversity of activities, we conjecture that also the natures that perform them are diverse. In fact, it is impossible that those realities that are separated from each other by natural principle ( κατά τον τῆς φύσεως λογον) coincide with one another in the form of activities (fire does not produce cold, nor ice heat), but according to the differences of natures the activities [performed] by them are also separated one from another. Instead, if we conceive as unique the activity of the Father, the Son and of the Holy Spirit, [an activity] which is not distinguished nor changed in any of them, then it is necessary to infer the unity of nature from the identity of activity." (Ad Eustathium, GNO III/1, 11, 3-15, tr. Maspero, 2007, p. 57)

Gregory of Nyssa: "[...][the activity] is separated from the first by the fact of not being a nature, but a movement of nature (φύσεως κινησις)[...]"

"We say that one works metal or wood, or carries out another of such activities (ἐνεργεῖν). Therefore, language presents at once both the art and he who exercises the art, so that if one separates one thing, the other cannot subsist. If then, the two realities are thought one together with the other, that is activity itself and he who acts through it, how is it that in this case one says that on the first substance ( τῃ οὐσίᾳ τῃ πρωτῃ) follows activity that produces the second substance, as if mediating in itself between the one and the other, without being confused with the first according to nature, nor being tied to the second? For [the activity] is separated from the first by the fact of not being a nature, but a movement of nature ( φύσεως κινησις), and is not united to that which results because it does not have as proper result a simple activity, but an active substance." (CE I, GNO I, 88, 4-17, tr. Maspero 2007, p. 40)

"[...]the existence of things created is an effect of the Divine will, but not posterior to it in time."

"[...]the existence of things created is an effect of the Divine will, but not posterior to it in time. For the case is different from that of men endowed by nature with practical ability, where you may look at capability and execution apart from each other. For example, we say of a man who possesses the art of shipbuilding, that he is always a shipbuilder in respect of his ability to build ships, but that he operates only when he displays his skill in working. It is otherwise with God; for all that we can conceive as in Him is entirely work and action, His will passing over immediately to its object." (Against Eunomius' Second Book, NPNF, p. 273)

[...]conception is the method by which we discover things that are unknown, going on to further discoveries by means of what adjoins to and follows from our first perception with regard to the thing studied."

"[...]conception is the method by which we discover things that are unknown, going on to further discoveries by means of what adjoins to and follows from our first perception with regard to the thing studied. For when we have formed some idea of what we seek to know, by adapting what follows to the first result of our discoveries we gradually conduct our inquiry to the end of our proposed research. But why enumerate the greater and more splendid results of this faculty? For every one who is not unfriendly to truth can see for himself that all else that Time has discovered for the service and benefit of human life, has been discovered by no other instrumentality than that of conception." (ἐπίνοια, i.e. ἔφοδος εὑρετικὴ τῶν ἀγνοουμένων, διὰ τῶν προσεχῶν τε καὶ ἀκολούθων...τὸ ἐφέξῆς ἐξευρίσκουσα) (Answer to Eunomius' Second Book, NPNF, p. 268)

"[...]the power of God and His operation are incomprehensible, and incapable of being reduced to rule, easily producing whatever He wills[...]"

"How does heaven exist? how earth? how sea? how every single thing? For everywhere men's reasoning, perplexed in the attempt at discovery, falls back upon this syllable "how," as those who cannot walk fall back upon a seat. To speak concisely, everywhere the power of God and His operation are incomprehensible, and incapable of being reduced to rule, easily producing whatever He wills, while concealing from us the minute knowledge of His operation." (On the Baptism of Christ, NPNF, p. 520)