CONTRA FATUM

"Perhaps we have not clearly learned that the names which signify that which comes into being are successive to the things and that nominal words are like the shadows of things, which receive form according to the movements of that which subsists in hypostasis ( τῶν ὑφεστωτων)?" (CE II, GNO I, 269, 11-14, tr. Maspero, 2007, p. 104)

"Since then, it is believed that the divine nature ( τό θεῖον) is simple ( ἁπλοῦν), free from composition (ἀσύνθετον) and impossible to represent (ἀσχημάτιστον), when human nature ( τό ἀντθρώπινον) is liberated from the double composition, and returns perfectly ( ἀκριβῶς) to the good, having become simple and impossible to represent and truly one ( ώς αληθῶς ἕν γενομενον), then that which appears will be the same as that which is hidden, and that which is hidden the same as that which appears, then truly is carried to accomplishment the beatitude and such man are truly called sons of God, proclaimed blessed according to the promise of our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom be glory for eternity. Amen" (Gal 1.5, Heb 13.21 and 2 Tm 4.18) (On the Beatitudes, GNO VII/2, 160, tr. Maspero, 2007, p. 73)

"Therefore, if we see that the activities (ἐνεργείας) performed by the ( ἐνεργουμένας παρα) Father, by the Son and by the Holy Spirit differ one from another, based in the diversity of activities, we conjecture that also the natures that perform them are diverse. In fact, it is impossible that those realities that are separated from each other by natural principle ( κατά τον τῆς φύσεως λογον) coincide with one another in the form of activities (fire does not produce cold, nor ice heat), but according to the differences of natures the activities [performed] by them are also separated one from another. Instead, if we conceive as unique the activity of the Father, the Son and of the Holy Spirit, [an activity] which is not distinguished nor changed in any of them, then it is necessary to infer the unity of nature from the identity of activity." (Ad Eustathium, GNO III/1, 11, 3-15, tr. Maspero, 2007, p. 57)

"We say that one works metal or wood, or carries out another of such activities (ἐνεργεῖν). Therefore, language presents at once both the art and he who exercises the art, so that if one separates one thing, the other cannot subsist. If then, the two realities are thought one together with the other, that is activity itself and he who acts through it, how is it that in this case one says that on the first substance ( τῃ οὐσίᾳ τῃ πρωτῃ) follows activity that produces the second substance, as if mediating in itself between the one and the other, without being confused with the first according to nature, nor being tied to the second? For [the activity] is separated from the first by the fact of not being a nature, but a movement of nature ( φύσεως κινησις), and is not united to that which results because it does not have as proper result a simple activity, but an active substance." (CE I, GNO I, 88, 4-17, tr. Maspero 2007, p. 40)